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Using longitudinal income-tax registers, we study how past labour market outcomes affect 
current labour market transition rates. We focus on hysteresis effects of the durations and 
incidence of previous spells out of work. We estimate flexible multi-state Mixed Proportional 
Hazard specifications for transition rates between employment, unemployment, and 
welfare/non-participation. Our main finding is that after longer periods of employment with 
high income, individuals' transition rates from unemployment to employment increase. 
Longer periods of non-employment generally decrease future transition rates to work, and 
sometimes also from work. The quantitative magnitude of persistency and hysteresis effects 
on inequality is modest. 
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In this paper we study the relationships between labour market outcomes and
subsequent labour market transitions. This means that we try to account for the
fact that future labour market opportunities change during the labour market
career of an individual. Some individuals may gain job-seeking skills through an
expanding network of individuals who can be called upon whenever a job is lost.
Other individuals lose job-¯nding skills when they become demotivated after long
periods without a job or when they become stigmatised or isolated. There are
many other ways in which current labour market outcomes of an individual can
a®ect future opportunities. Such dynamic chains may include many variables, like
wages, bene¯t levels, and even marriage prospects, but we focus our attention to
transition rates between labour market states.
We label the relationships between labour market outcomes and subsequent
labour market transitions persistencies. The term persistency has sometimes
been used to describe the stability of equilibria, or negative feedback loops of
unemployment. Here the term is used for any causal relationship between previ-
ous individual labour market outcomes and current labour market opportunities.
Persistencies are of importance for the functioning of the economy. First, they
may involve changes in human capital. Persistencies that reduce human capital,
such as a loss of skills during long periods of unemployment, thereby a®ect the
allocation of individuals in the entire economy and a®ect the wealth of the entire
population. Policies can be designed to target those groups su®ering most from
loss of skills.
Because the persistencies a®ect future labour market states, they also impact
upon the distribution of unemployment and employment in the economy, which
raises issues of allocation. Labour market states can impact on other areas of life,
such as social networks or community cohesion. Apart from this wider interest,
the interest in persistencies is also driven by a simple desire to understand the
workings of the labour market.
One speci¯c type of persistency that has attracted a lot of attention in the
economic literature is the e®ect of longer spells of unemployment on future transi-
tion rates. In the hysteresis literature (see e.g. the 25 mentioned articles in R¿ed,
1997), several mechanisms are suggested through which spells of unemployment
negatively a®ect future labour market outcomes. One is the classic argument
of Phelps (1972) that individuals lose their skills during unemployment, which
negatively a®ects future possibilities of ¯nding a job. If a region is hit by a neg-
ative shock that causes a high level of unemployment, such a loss of skills can
2worsen the ensuing recession or at least delay economic recovery. This line of
reasoning was advanced by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), who try to explain
European unemployment levels: the generous social security payments in much
of Europe increase unemployment durations, which increases the exposure of the
unemployed to a possible loss of skills. In this way, the generous social security
payments in Europe were argued to aggravate, especially in volatile economic
periods, the negative e®ects of loss of skills during unemployment. Other mech-
anisms known in the literature through which there are negative e®ects of longer
spells of unemployment on future transition rates to employment are discourage-
ment, stigma, or an adaptation of social norms (e.g. Piore, 1971; or Lindbeck,
1995).
Much of the older empirical literature on hysteresis uses aggregate data. One
popular approach has been to look at whether unemployment rates follow a ran-
dom walk. If they do, then the current unemployment rate can be seen as the
best predictor of the future unemployment rate, and there would then be no ten-
dency of the economy to move to any `natural rate' (see R¿ed, 1997). Obviously,
this method has its °aws as there are upper and lower bounds on the level of
unemployment and the hypothesis of a random walk is somewhat extreme. As
is argued in R¿ed (1997), it seems more realistic to suppose that there is a high
degree of persistence of the current unemployment rate. Another drawback is
that aggregate unemployment rates give no evidence for a particular mechanism
driving the persistence.
By now there is also a substantial empirical literature using individual records
to study the e®ect of past individual unemployment durations on individual tran-
sition rates, notably the transition rate from unemployment to work. The main
econometric challenge is to disentangle the causal e®ect from spurious selection
e®ects due to unobserved individual characteristics. If an individual has a low
future transition rate to employment, this may either be due to what happened
before or to an unobserved individual trait that also in°uenced past outcomes.
Existing studies typically deal with this by resorting to random-e®ects speci¯-
cations with time-invariant unobserved traits that are orthogonal to observed
characteristics.1 We brie°y list a few previous ¯ndings. Heckman and Borjas
(1980) study the labour market careers of 122 individuals with multiple unem-
ployment spells. They ¯nd no e®ect of previous unemployment spells on current
transition rates from unemployment to employment. Using a much larger data
1See Magnac (2000) and D'Addio and Honor¶ e (2002) for alternative approaches with
individual-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects (allowed to be correlated to the observed characteristics) in
discrete-time settings.
3set, Lynch (1985, 1989) also ¯nds no e®ects. Her estimates vary sharply with the
assumed functional form of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. Omori
(1997), who studies the careers of 2184 young men drawn from the US National
Youth Longitudinal Study, does ¯nd that longer periods without employment lead
to lower future transition rates to employment, which he attributes to a stigma
e®ect. Blau (1994) also studies unemployment persistencies but focuses exclu-
sively on older men. For additional micro-econometric studies, see Gregg (2001)
and Burgess et al. (2003), who both focus on younger individuals, Arulampalam
(2002), and Choi and Shin (2002). The previous studies have all provided major
contributions to the understanding of persistency as an empirical phenomenon,
and they have been in°uential in policy debates. At the same time one may argue
that the model frameworks are in one sense or another more restrictive than ours
(see below).
A full-blown empirical analysis of \persistency" e®ects on all possible labour
market transitions is a formidable task. Reliable estimation of unemployment-
related persistencies requires large numbers of individuals who experience unem-
ployment more than once. The measurement of unemployment incidence and
duration should be precise. Clearly, if the number of previous spells is a relevant
determinant of future outcomes then the data should contain accurate measure-
ments of this number. Reliable inference also requires the researcher to address
the initial-conditions problems that plague the dynamic analysis of causal e®ects
of lagged endogenous variables. Moreover, it is important that income variables
are reliably observed as well, because otherwise one may overlook potentially
relevant model determinants, leading to omitted-variable biases. Similarly, we
need to observe employment spells and non-participation spells, to deal with per-
sistencies running through employment and non-participation, and to deal with
right-censoring due to ¯niteness of the observation window.
In this paper we use a data set with features that allow us to deal with these
requirements to a high degree. This data set is the Dutch IPO register, which
is based on income tax records. The data set contains labour market outcomes
of about 65000 individuals aged between 14 and 55 over nine years, covering the
time period 1989{1997. There are four major advantages of using such register
data (as opposed to surveys). One is that there is no non-response or attrition
out°ow apart from death and migration, and that the in°ow is random. Hence
sample selectivity, which is often considerable in longitudinal surveys, is not an
issue with administrative data. Another advantage is that we avoid the problems
of recall with respect to previous transitions: individuals are likely to under-
report the incidence of short spells in surveys. This issue was investigated by
4Albaek and Larsen (1993) who were able to compare register data with survey
data on the same set of Danish individuals. Their ¯nding was that register
data include about double the number of (unemployment) spells, mainly because
they include many interruptions to the periods of unemployment that individuals
themselves did not mention. The third advantage of register data is that they
often have superior measurements of the income of individuals, because the recall
of individuals regarding their incomes is very unlikely to be better than the
information from the tax authorities. A ¯nal advantage is that register data sets
are often very large. This is also the case with the administrative data set used
in this paper, which covers about 65000 adults. Because of this large size, we can
a®ord to look only at the new entrants into the sample, which allows us to avoid
initial conditions problems as well, i.e., the large sample size means we can avoid
using people for whom we do not know the full labour market history.
We hence use the 4897 individuals whose entrance into the labour market we
can observe. Extensive information is available about the sources of incomes and
household composition of individuals over the observation window. The large
number of individuals and spells enables us to distinguish between three possi-
ble labour market states, whereas in most analyses mentioned only employment
and non-employment is discerned. Allowing for employment, unemployment and
non-participation results in about 15000 spells, with a large variety of observed
individual careers. In Section 2, we extensively examine the characteristics of this
data set, and we explain the choices we make to operationalise the three labour
market states. The transition rates between employment, unemployment, and
non-participation are then analysed with an extension of the Mixed Proportional
Hazard model. For a survey of this type of model, see Van den Berg (2001).
In Section 3 we present model speci¯cations based on di®erent assumptions
about the unobserved heterogeneity distribution and on the endogeneity of in-
dividual income. From standard search theory it would seem very likely that
transition rates are intimately connected with earnings potential (and hence ac-
tual incomes) because earnings potential a®ects reservation wages and hence the
probability of ¯nding acceptable o®ers. An ad-hoc analysis in the Appendix in-
deed suggests endogeneity of incomes. The data do not allow for a structural
analysis though, because we lack some essential information (such as bene¯t en-
titlement) needed to model individual choices. We hence deal with endogeneity
by presenting a sequence of speci¯cations in which we ignore income as an ex-
planatory variable and a sequence of speci¯cations in which we include income
and ignore the possible endogeneity. In this way we can at least get a good idea
as to the robustness of the found persistencies, and in the process qualitatively
5assess the seriousness of the endogeneity of income.
After discussing the di®erences in speci¯cation in Section 3, we try to clarify
the ¯ndings by a simulation study in which we turn o® persistence e®ects to
compute the net e®ect of persistencies on the participation rates of the whole
population. We use these simulations to analyse the determinants of inequality in
unemployment duration and in cumulative incomes. Following these simulations,
we look at the e®ect of alternative assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution. The ¯nal section concludes.
2 Data and method
2.1 Method
We model the rate that an individual makes a transition after a duration t in the
current state, given that that individual has not yet made the transition. This
amounts to modelling the transition rates µk
j from state k to state j. Here, k and
j are taken from the set fe;u;ng, where e stands for employment, u stands for
unemployment and n for non-participation. We use the popular Mixed Propor-
tional Hazard speci¯cation. This allows for a baseline hazard ¸(t) through which
the transition probability changes with the elapsed duration of a spell. Further-
more, the model allows for an unobserved heterogeneity value v which a®ects
the transition rate multiplicatively at each time period and which is orthogonal
to observed individual characteristics. We sketch the speci¯cation of the hazard
rate for a particular individual for the transition from unemployment to work,
where the other 5 hazard rates are de¯ned analogously:
µ
u
e(tjv;x;¿;h) = ¸(t) ¢ c(¿ + t) ¢ v ¢ e
x0¯+h°
µu
e(tjv;x;¿;h) is the hazard rate from unemployment to employment given unob-
served individual characteristic v; a set of observed individual characteristics x
that may di®er for each spell; a calendar time of entry ¿ into unemployment, and
a set of variables describing past labour market outcomes h: On the right-hand
side, c(¿ +t) is a non-negative time-varying function that allows for the fact that
hazard rates can be di®erent over seasons due to demand factors.
We take a non-parametric speci¯cation for the baseline function ¸(t) by allow-
ing for a ¯xed value ¸(t) within a time interval, and allowing for di®erent values
in di®erent time intervals. By taking suitable intervals, we can thereby allow for
a very °exible shape of the baseline hazard. ¯ and ° are parameters that relate
to the individual characteristics and the outcome of previous spells.
6Given that we do not observe the unobserved heterogeneity component, we
have to integrate it out to obtain a likelihood. An example: the likelihood of














where G(v) denotes the distribution of v and the integral should be read in the
Lebesque sense. In this likelihood, e¡
R T
0 µu
e (tjv;x;¿;h)dt equals the probability of not
making a transition to employment before T; e¡
R T
0 µu
n(tjv;x;¿;h)dt is the probability
of not making a transition to non-participation before T; and µu
e(Tjv;x;¿;h) is
the conditional rate of making a transition to employment at T. If we would
observe one spell of unemployment ending in employment and a censored spell






















where the subscript 1 refers to the values in the ¯rst spell and the subscript 2 for







n(tjv;x2;¿2;h2)dt in the second line equals the proba-
bility of not going from employment to either unemployment or non-participation
before T2. The likelihood of even more spells is constructed analogue. Given that
the maximum number of spells observed in our data set is 22 one can see that
the expressions become rather involved.
A major issue is the speci¯cation of the distribution of v: Here we take a
°exible non-parametric approach by taking a distribution with a ¯xed number of
mass-points. For the transition of unemployment to work this means we allow
v to take on the values fv1;::;vMg. Although we will show the likelihood of
speci¯cations in which M=2, which is the most common speci¯cation in the
literature, using Akaike's information criterion2 the ¯nal speci¯cations all have
M=3. These means we allow v to take on the values fv1;v2;v3g. Because there are
6 possible transitions, this means we have 6*3=18 heterogeneity values. Figures
1 and 2 show two possible ways of dealing with the probability mass points of
these heterogeneity values: In both ¯gures, the superscripts identify the transition
2Akaike's information criterion is to take the model that maximises AIC(C)=-2ln Lc +2Nc
(with C the number of points of support and Nc the number of parameters to be estimated).
7involved. Hence, vb
3 means the third possible unobserved heterogeneity value of
the transition from employment to unemployment.
In Figure 1 we assume that the unobserved individual traits only lead to three
di®erent possible e®ects. Hence, there are only three possible combinations of het-




















In Figure 2 we allow for any combination between the three allowed pairs
fv;vag, the three allowed pairs fvb;vcg, and the three allowed pairs fvd;vfg,
leading to 27 probability points. This second speci¯cation allows for much more
°exible patterns of unobserved heterogeneity but comes at the expense of more
parameters to be estimated. A speci¯cation in which any combination of the six
heterogeneity values is allowed (with nine possible pairs of fv;vag, etc.) exceeds
the data-possibilities. Sensitivity analyses regarding alternative choices for this
heterogeneity distribution will be shown.
We impose no restrictions on the values of the heterogeneity points (no one-
factor loading). This avoids the problem identi¯ed by Lindeboom and Van den
Berg (1994) of one-factor loading models that they implicitly assume a ¯xed
relationship between the variance of each marginal heterogeneity distribution and
the correlation structure between the heterogeneity distributions of the di®erent
states. See Van den Berg (2001) for a general overview of identi¯cation results
for single-state and multi-state duration models.
2.2 Data
About 6% of the tax-records of the Dutch population (randomly selected) in the
period January 1, 1989, through December 31, 1997, are stored in the Income
Panel data base (IPO). Simple sample characteristics and basic analyses of this
data base can be found in De Koning et al. (1998). Because of the con¯dential
nature of income tax records, only few international publications have used the
IPO data (see e.g. Van Leeuwen and Pannekoek, 2002, Atkinson and Salverda,
2005, Manting and Bouman, 2006, and Van Vuren and Van Vuuren, 2007).
The data include information on all the labour market spells of about 65000
adults aged 15 to 55. A spell indicates a particular `source of income', of which
there are 15 [% of the whole population in this income source in brackets]:
1. Only wages [33%]
2. Unemployment bene¯t [4%]
3. Special unemployment bene¯t [3%]
84. 2+wage income [4%]
5. 3+wage income [1.5%]
6. 2+non-wage income (such as alimony or welfare) [1%]
7. 3+non-wage income [0.2%]
8. welfare bene¯ts [2%]
9. 8+wage income [1%]
10. 8+non-wage income [0.2%]
11. disability bene¯ts [2.5%]
12. 11+wage income [1%]
13. 11+non-wage income [0.5%]
14. other incomes (such as alimony or pro¯ts) [19%]
15. no income [27%]
In order to see how we might reduce these 15 sources of income into three
states, some background information on the Dutch bene¯t system is necessary.
All Dutch inhabitants are entitled to welfare bene¯ts if they do not have
paid employment or if their paid employment does not su±ce to reach a legal
minimum. Individuals who have never worked before are therefore entitled to
bene¯t payments, possibly augmented with a child-support allowance to which
all child-rearing families are entitled. Most other bene¯ts are related to an em-
ployment history: the more hours of work spent in employment, the longer the
subsequent entitlement to unemployment bene¯ts. Also, for workers there is a
disability allowance system by which individuals who become disabled obtain a
¯xed percentage of their last-earned income in bene¯ts until the legal retirement
age of 65. At 65, all individuals obtain a state pension, augmented with whatever
they have provided for themselves or was provided for via pre-paid employment
related pensions. A peculiarity of the Dutch system is that there are many `grey
states' in the bene¯t system. It is for instance possible that someone has been
declared `disabled' for 50%. This means he or she is entitled to 50% of the ben-
e¯t for disability and may simultaneously enjoy an unemployment bene¯t or an
income from a job in which the individuals works a fraction of the time. Other
9`grey states' are that individuals can receive bene¯ts together with alimony pay-
ments or capital incomes. Unfortunately, the data only has reliable information
on which sources of income an individual has, not on the relative importance of
each source.
Now, it is the case that most of the groups that hardly search for jobs, and
whom we might label as non-participants, either have no source of income or
receive di®erent bene¯ts than unemployment bene¯ts: persons who are supported
by the income of someone else in the family fall under the `no-income' category,
as do students. The group of welfare recipients includes persons who have never
had paid employment and are not looking for work, such as some lone parents or
some disabled individuals. But this category also contains individuals who are
looking for jobs but have never worked before, such as school leavers, and contains
those who have exhausted their unemployment bene¯t entitlement. Although it
is clearly imperfect terminology, we do label the groups of individuals on welfare
and on `no income' as non-participants. Note that these individuals are identi¯ed
in the income tax register data because they have entered the register at an earlier
stage in their life.
We thus reduce the possible 15 sources of income to three distinct states: work,
de¯ned as only having income from wages or pro¯ts; unemployment, de¯ned
as having amongst the sources of income an unemployment bene¯t; and non-
participation, de¯ned as all other types of bene¯ts, unspeci¯ed sources of income
(such as alimony) or no-income. The main reason to make a distinction between
unemployment and non-participation is not that the latter group does not search
for jobs, but rather that it contains a higher percentage of individuals who do
not search for jobs. To examine whether the distinction is empirically justi¯ed,
we display the survival functions for the six possible transitions in Figure 3.
Several items stand out. We see that the transition rate from unemployment
to work shows the familiar tendency to be high in the ¯rst few months and then
to decrease over time. This can either be due to the fact that the most able
individuals ¯nd jobs ¯rst or it may be due to a true time-e®ect.
Probably because the unemployed run out of entitlement, the transition rate
from unemployment to non-participation increases over time. From non-participation
to work we see somewhat lower transition rates to work. The transition rate from
work into unemployment is lower, especially in the ¯rst year of employment, than
the transition rate into non-participation. This may well be due to the fact that
entitlement to bene¯ts contained in non-participation is immediate, whereas it
takes time in employment to build up any entitlement to unemployment bene¯ts.
There is hence some evidence of a systematic di®erence in the behaviour of the
10unemployed and the non-participants.
Another item standing out from these survival functions is that transitions
show quite di®erent duration dependencies, clearly indicating the need for a °ex-
ible baseline function as well as a possible need for a °exible heterogeneity dis-
tribution.
In order to see whether these transition rates di®er by gender, we show the
survival rates for women only, in Figure 4. Although the survival functions are
not identical, the curvatures and levels of the survival rates for men and women
together and for women only seem very similar for all possible transitions. Hence,
in the ensuing analyses we allow for gender speci¯c e®ects (also interacted with
the number of children) in all transitions, but we do not perform separate analyses
for women.
If we would want to use the whole population, we would have severe initial-
conditions problems: for those individuals already in the sample in 1989, it is
not only unknown how long their current spell is in progress, but their whole
labour market history is also unknown. Mainly for this reason, but also in order
to avoid the problems that are involved if we analyse several di®erent cohorts
simultaneously, we use only the 4898 adults for whom we observe the time that
they enter the income tax register, which is the moment they become active in the
labour market. The summary statistics of these individuals in their ¯rst spells
are then given in Table 1.
The results in this table show that most individuals live in a household with
more than 1 individual, that average incomes in unemployment are rather higher
than average incomes in work (though there is an obvious age-di®erence between
workers and the unemployed), and that most of the labour-market entrants who
live in households with children start in the work state. The table also shows that
71% of the entrants immediately has a job, probably straight out of school. The
fact that there are some people who are observed to start in unemployment, even
though they have no previous tax-record, is somewhat puzzling, because in the
Dutch welfare system unemployment bene¯ts are only given to individuals who
have previously worked. The small number of entrants into unemployment have
therefore probably had some previous incomes that were enough to qualify for
unemployment bene¯ts (such as odd jobs for work agencies), but not high enough
to have previous tax records. After ¯nishing school, they then claimed unemploy-
ment bene¯ts. It is open for debate how we should view such individuals, but
here we choose to see them as new entrants in unemployment.
The rough °ows between the three states in the whole period are given in
Table 2. On average, each individual experiences about 3 states in this period,
11and the °ow between each state is considerable. Next we look at the distribution
of these °ows over individuals in Table 3. Here we can see that although a large
number of individuals has only 1 or 2 spells, some 2249 individuals have more
than two spells, which allows a careful look at the e®ect of previous outcomes
(lengths of spells and incomes during these spells) on current transition rates.
Some problems with this data set that have to be mentioned: it is clear that
the number of individual characteristics available is rather scant. In particular,
there is no direct information available on education. As a proxy, we will use
the age at which an individual enters the labour market. Also the information
on incomes is restricted to the daily average income during a spell. Finally,
entitlements to bene¯ts are not known and cannot be computed accurately, for
one because the number of hours worked is not known.
3 Results
3.1 The model speci¯cation without income
We consider a range of models, with gradually more persistence variables and in-
creased °exibility of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. First we show a
basic speci¯cation in which we focus on the e®ect of the length of the cumulative
time spent out of work in previous spells on the current hazard rates into em-
ployment. To allow for °exibility, we use four dummies to indicate whether this
cumulate `non-employment' (=unemployment + non-participation) has passed
the threshold of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years. In this ¯rst speci¯cation,
the unobserved heterogeneity terms have three possible values for each hazard
rate and there are only three possible combinations (as in ¯gure 1).
In the second speci¯cation we add more persistence variables, mainly to show
that the coe±cients of personal characteristics change substantially. This implies
that the coe±cients of personal characteristics in studies that ignore persistence
e®ects will pick up part of the omitted persistence e®ect.
We mention that in the case with no income, virtually no likelihood im-
provement was made by adding extra °exibility to the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution by means of allowing for 27 possible combinations. As we will see,
when we consider income variable in the next section, added °exibility does add
to the likelihood and is justi¯ed under Akaike's criterion.
In Table 4, we ¯rst show the results of a simple speci¯cation, where the
heterogeneity distribution has three points of support, where there are no income
variables included, and where the number of persistence variable is minimal. We
12postpone a discussion of the coe±cients of individual characteristics until we
reach the ¯nal speci¯cations. We simply notice that these coe±cients are quite
di®erent for the hazard rates for unemployment and non-participation, which
shows another di®erence between these two states. Here, we are mostly interested
in the persistence variables and whether these change substantially when we
change the speci¯cation.
We can see here that the hazard from work generally increases when the
previous duration of non-work is long, though there are marked jumps after 2 and
3 years. Hence, it is especially within the range of 0-2 years than an increasing
duration of non-work increases hazard rates from employment. The hazard rates
from unemployment do not relate signi¯cantly to the length of previous non-work
in this speci¯cation.
Because the non-linearities are quite strong, we add more persistence vari-
ables, including a variable that indicates the length previously spent in work
(which is meant to pick up a tenure e®ect) and a variable indicating the length of
the previous spell without a job (which is supposed to tell us the importance of
recent history); see Table 5. There are some major changes in the coe±cients of
the individual characteristics, including many sign reversals. Hence, in a speci¯-
cation without persistence variables the individual characteristics pick part of the
e®ect of previous spells. As to the persistence e®ects themselves, we now see that
the e®ects of previous non-work on the hazard rates from employment turn out
to be more subtle: higher previous non-work duration decreases the hazard rate
from work to unemployment and increases the hazard rate to non-participation.
The e®ect of the cumulative previous non-work duration is almost opposite. This
indicates that long previous non-work duration increases the hazard rate to un-
employment if it is spread out over many previous non-work spells and decreases
the hazard rate to unemployment if it is concentrated in the last non-work spell.
The opposite goes for the hazard rates from employment to non-participation.
The hazard rates from unemployment to work are now signi¯cantly related
to previous outcomes. There are some marked non-linearities however, which we
will try to disentangle below.
The unobserved heterogeneity values show marked di®erences: the relative
di®erence between the unobserved heterogeneity values is in the order of a factor
10 for most of the possible hazard rates and each possible combination has more
than 15% probability mass. Both suggest quite a spread in unobserved hetero-
geneity terms. This in fact holds for the results in all speci¯cations with three
probability points.
133.2 Speci¯cations with income
Now, we add income variables (see Table 6). That is, we add income and variables
summarising previous incomes (such as cumulative income and income in the
previous spell). We immediately consider the ¯nal speci¯cation which includes
27 possible combinations of the individual heterogeneity terms (as in Figure 2).
Most of the found e®ects of individual characteristics are similar to those in
Table 5: there is only one sign reversal and the absolute di®erences in the coe±-
cients are also small. The di®erence in coe±cients of the persistence variables is
much bigger. The increase in the likelihood is su±cient to justify the inclusion
of income variables.
The coe±cients of the individual characteristics are not surprising. An excep-
tion is the insigni¯cance of gender and the number of children on transition rates:
though a higher number of children does, as expected, reduce transition rates out
of non-participation (especially for women), the e®ects are not very signi¯cant or
large. This signals that one of the main peculiarities of the Dutch labour market
in previous decades, i.e., persistently low labour market participation levels of
women (especially those with children), is a thing of the past for the new cohorts
studied here.
The baseline hazards show some marked non-linearities, with perhaps the
most striking the fact that baseline transition rates from work to non-participation
are a lot higher after one year than they were just before the end of a year. Per-
haps this re°ects the fact that eligibility for wage related disability insurance
bene¯ts depends on the time that people have been employed prior to onset of
the impairment (see for instance De Jong et al., 2008). That transition rates of
unemployment to work are rather constant, whilst the transition rates into non-
participation increase over time, is also not surprising because the possibility
of claiming unemployment bene¯t disappears after a while. The seasonal e®ect
shows that mobility is substantially lower during the colder months of the year
(before April).
The longer the previous work duration, the lower the transition rates out of
work. A higher cumulative work duration has the opposite e®ect. This means
that a high cumulative work duration concentrated in the last work spell has
much less e®ect on the exit rates out of employment than a high cumulative work
duration spread over many work spells. Long un-interrupted spells of employment
hence do not lead to a positive persistency for transition rates from work.
In general, the income persistencies are also clear: the higher previous in-
comes in non-employment, the lower the exit rates into work, and the higher the
exit rates into unemployment. Because incomes in non-employment are strongly
14related to bene¯t levels, this signals a `pull-e®ect' from higher bene¯ts into un-
employment. A high income during work increases future transition rates into
work from the other states, which suggests that individuals pick up 'job-¯nding
skills', such as contacts, during well-paid spells of employment. Also, those with
a high income in previous job have a lower transition rate into non-participation.
In comparison, the e®ects of cumulative income are small, though there is some
indication that unemployed individuals who have earned a lot in the past, are
more likely to go into non-participation than to work, perhaps representing a
wealth e®ect for the demand for leisure.
The duration persistencies for time spent out of work are less clear. Previous
non-work duration increases the chances of leaving employment and reduces the
employment chances of those who are currently not working. On the other hand,
the cumulative time spent out of work indicates opposite e®ects for exit rates
out of work. Individuals who have been out of work for more than two years
have lower exit rates out of employment, perhaps signaling that the experience
of long times out of work may make workers more cautious not to lose their
job. The net e®ect of longer previous spells of non-employment on transition
rates to work is negative for those who have a long uninterrupted spell of non-
employment. Hence, it does seem that some skills are being lost during periods of
non-employment. Apart from this negative e®ect of non-employment, the e®ect
of longer spells without a job probably has a second negative persistency via the
e®ect of long non-employment on future wages (see Table 9 in the Appendix for
a basic income analysis).3
3.3 Simulations
Because the total impact of these persistencies are highly non-linear and, through
the multiplicative structure of the MPH-model, depend on all the characteristics
of all individuals, we need to look at simulations in which we turn some of the
persistencies o® if we want to get a feeling for the importance of the persistencies
on labour participation rates.
Therefore we shall look at selected counterfactuals. In order to create coun-
terfactuals, we must ¯rst simulate labour market histories under the assumption
that the conditions of the model hold forever. Hence we have to calculate ¯c-
3Though the e®ect of the last non-employment spell on transition rates is positive, this e®ect
is always smaller than that of the cumulative amount of time spent without a job. This suggests
that individuals who often move between unemployment and non-participation during a long
period of non-employment, lose less skills than individuals who are not mobile during a long
period of non-employment.
15titious lives in which ¯ctitious individuals change states stochastically and see
their personal characteristics change just like individuals do in the sample. This
will give us a reference base for the counterfactuals and will also give us some in-
dication as to the ability of the model to explain actual participation rate, which
provides a qualitative goodness-of-¯t test.
The basis of the simulation is to take M individuals with initial observed
characteristics x0; with unobserved heterogeneity v0; with initial state S0; and
then to simulate entire labour market histories for these individuals, whereby the
characteristics are updated annually to re°ect the fact that some characteristics
change over time (like age and the number of children).
There are four relevant issues that have to be dealt with in order to be able
to do simulations:
1. The initial characteristics of the simulated population x0 must be close to
that of the actual population. We let the initial conditions of the simu-
lated population be equal to the initial conditions of new entrants in the
population, i.e. the younger cohorts. This means we start with an initial
population in which the age of entry, gender, location, entry state, entry
income and unobserved heterogeneity are chosen to coincide with that of
new entrants. Each M individuals thus consists of a random draw from the
sample of new entrants. The simulated individual `inherits' the starting
characteristics of the assigned new entrant, as well as a random draw of the
posterior Bayesian distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity v of that
new entrant random (this ex-post distribution is calculated by using the
actual transition history of the entrant). The Appendix provides details.
The choice to use the younger cohorts means the simulations are not meant
to replicate the historical behaviour of the whole sample.
2. The changes in observable characteristics that a®ect transition rates must
be close to those observed. This means we have to account for the fact that
age, the number of children in the household and marital status change
over time. For this we estimated simple probit transition models for the
time-varying number of children and marital status. We estimated these
probits on the entire sample of 65,000 individuals in the Income Panel data
base.
3. Incomes during a spell must re°ect personal characteristics and labour mar-
ket history. For this we estimate log-incomes in two stages. In the ¯rst stage
we predict whether an individual will have positive incomes in that spell
16based on his individual characteristics (probit). If the individual is assigned
to have a positive income, he is given a random draw from a truncated
log-normal income distribution with a mean determined by his observable
characteristics and labour market history.
4. Transition intensities must re°ect true transition intensities. For this we
took the estimated hazard functions from Table 6.
Hence we simulate individual labour market histories for 10,000 individuals
by assigning them initial conditions that mimic those of new entrants and by
then having them experience stochastically determined transitions, changes in
personal characteristics and income changes according to the model predictions
and additional simple estimations. An obvious weak point in this procedure is
that the estimation of changes in personal characteristics and incomes is implicitly
taken independent of the estimation of the MPH-models, basically because there
are no good instruments to allow for endogeneities. This means we probably miss
out on some important endogeneities which may hinder inferences.
We now look at two counterfactuals: in the ¯rst counterfactual we compute
what would happen if there would be no e®ect from previous incomes in work
and cumulative incomes. This means that we set the values of ln(Income prev. job),
ln(Income prev. non-work) and ln(cum income) in Table 6 at zero for all transitions.
In the third scenario we calculate what would happen if the duration of previous
spells of non-employment would not have any e®ect. This implies setting the
values of ln(cum. nw duration), the dummies for cum nw dur and ln(previous non-work
dur) at zero for all transitions. The results are shown in Figure 5 in terms of labour
market participation levels under the di®erent scenarios. We add the averages of
the participation rates of the sample of entrants for comparison.
Firstly we can see that there is a di®erence between the baseline simulation
and the sample averages: the drop in participation rates and the subsequent
increase is smaller for the simulations than in the sample. One reason for the di-
vergence between the simulated participation rates and the actual ones is that the
comparison is not entirely perfect: by construction, the actual participation rates
in the sample are based on selective groups. Those starting aged 15 for instance
in 1989 only reached the age of 23 in 1997. This means that the participation rate
of individuals in the sample for those aged 24 will not contain anyone who started
at age 15, which is an obvious selection bias in the actual data. Hence, the com-
position of the sample participation rates does not re°ect the composition of the
simulation results, where everyone who enters is counted for all subsequent ages.
The fact that the simulated participation rates are close to the entire population
17participation rate in this period (about 70%) are encouraging in this sense.
Another important possible reason for this is that we treat the probability
of ¯nding a job when leaving school on a par with ¯nding a job when being
non-participant. In reality, the exit out of school may be endogenous to having
a job outside school. If only those individuals leave school who have private
information to believe they will quickly ¯nd a job, then the participation rate of
those who left school will rise more quickly then our simulations would predict,
giving rise to an underestimate for participation rates for the range of ages where
individuals can leave school. Given that the simulated participation rates for
older individuals is closer to the actual participation rate, this indeed could be
one reason.
The general trends are the same though for the simulation and for the ac-
tual sample averages. The percentage of individuals in employment (=labour
participation level) in the baseline simulation and in actuality is the lowest for
individuals aged near 18, which is when a large glut of school leavers enters the
labour market. Individuals entering the labour market before that age more often
start in employment than the individuals who enter at 18. The simulation does
replicate the initial decline and increase in participation rates for di®erent ages
and seems to produce a somewhat smoother line than the actual participation
rates.
As we can see, the e®ect of omitting the income persistencies increases labour
participation levels for individuals in the age range from 17 to 30. In this range the
negative persistencies from work income dominate and ignoring them hence re-
sults in lower participation rates. After this age range, the participation levels are
almost the same without income persistencies. Looking at Table 6, the negative
persistencies in question are that transition rates from employment are higher if
previous incomes were higher and that transition rates to employment were lower
when cumulative income was higher. The positive persistencies (higher transi-
tion rates into work with higher previous income) only outweigh these negative
persistencies at higher ages.
For the persistencies from non-employment spells the results are clearer in the
sense that labour market participation levels are a lot lower from about age 20
upwards when we ignore the length of non-employment. The net e®ect of pre-
vious spells of non-employment on current employment levels is hence positive.
One positive persistence that can be observed from Table 6 is that longer cumu-
lative spells (above 2 years) of non-employment decrease transition rates from
work. This apparently outweighs the negative e®ect of longer periods of non-
employment on future transition rates from unemployment and non-participation
18to work.
Simulations of duration and income inequality
In the analysis of inequality, several studies have stressed the need to take account
of the fact that cross-sectional inequality may grossly overstate the inequality in
present values, if there is a large amount of mobility in the labour market (Flinn,
2002; Bowlus and Robin, 2004; Cohen, 1999). In the extreme case, when there is
no discounting and individuals are homogeneous, life-time inequality may vanish
for in¯nitely long lives whereas cross-sectional inequality may be substantial.
Bowlus and Robin (2004) and Cohen (1999) estimate or calibrate matching
models and then use the estimates to calculate life-time inequality measures.
Cohen (1999) ¯nds that cross-sectional wage inequality is 60% higher in the US
than in France, but total life-time earnings are only 15% more unequal in the
US than in France. Bowlus and Robin (2004) ¯nd that cross-sectional wages are
about twice as unequal as life-time `job values'.
Flinn simulates possible working experiences based on an estimated search
model and also ¯nds a substantial reduction in the amount of inequality when
taking mobility into account. Most of the interest has hence been in wage in-
equality. Because this paper focuses on the proper estimation of transition rates
however, we will con¯ne our inequality analyses to inequality in non-employment
duration.
Motivated by these preceding papers, we simulate here the inequality in cu-
mulative non-employment duration for individuals who are 40. We take 40 years
of age as the cut-o® point because that age is close to the maximum age range ob-
served in the sample. We hence take the same simulation approach as above. To
augment the same two counterfactuals as above, we also show here the amount of
inequality that remains if we assume that there is no unobserved heterogeneity4.
Because the preceding papers that look at inequality do not allow for unobserved
heterogeneity, this puts our results apart from theirs and allows us to judge the
importance of taking this factor into account.
In Figure 6 we show the cumulative time spent in unemployment under the
baseline simulation and the three counterfactuals. Clearly, the amount of in-
equality is hardly a®ected by the persistencies. However, omitting unobserved
heterogeneity signi¯cantly reduces the estimated amount of inequality. This is
con¯rmed by Table 7, where we compute some inequality measures for the base-
4For each of the six possible transitions, each individual is then assigned the geometric mean
of the three unobserved heterogeneity points.
19line, the cross-sectional distribution, and the counterfactuals.
First we may note that these inequality measure are much higher than those
based on samples of workers or of households (such as those used by Bowlus and
Robin, 2004). Hence our sample contains a lot of individuals with zero incomes
or durations, which means that log-variation and 90/10 deciles cannot even be
calculated for the cross-section. The only individuals with zero incomes live in
households where someone else receives positive incomes or bene¯ts, so these
individual measures greatly overstate the amount of inequality at the household
level.
Again we see that `turning o®' persistencies has little e®ect on inequalities.
Turning o® unobserved heterogeneity reduces inequality much more however: log-
duration inequality is about 50% lower without unobserved heterogeneity than
with. Hence the dramatic drops that some authors ¯nd when they compare
lifetime income inequality with cross-sectional inequality have to be taken with
care if they do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
Inequality in cumulative duration does appear to be more than 50% lower
than cross-sectional results, if we take the Gini-coe±cient as a criterion. Hence
this study also ¯nds that cross-sectional inequality is a poor measure of lifetime
inequality.
In Figure 7 we show the distribution of cumulative income for individuals
aged 40 under the baseline model and with the persistencies and unobserved het-
erogeneity turned o®. We only show the bottom 30% of the distribution because
there is virtually no di®erence for the top 70%. Here again we see that turning
o® the unobserved heterogeneity has the biggest in°uence on the distribution in
the sense of reducing inequality. Turning employment persistence o® increases
inequality in the sense of increase the proportion of low-income individuals in
the population, i.e. being in low-income jobs for a while reduces the prospects of
getting higher income jobs later which increases inequality.
3.4 Model variations
In this sub-section we assess the importance of the °exibility of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution. We look at three di®erent cases. The cases di®er
in two dimensions. They also di®er in the amount of possible heterogeneity
points for each transition exit, i.e., the number of mass-points of the marginal
heterogeneity distribution F x
j of the transition from x to j. The also di®er in
the restrictions on the possible combinations between the heterogeneity values of
di®erent states.
201. Each F x
j has two mass-points. We only restrict the probability distribution
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j;i denotes the particular heterogeneity value an individual i has for the
transition from u to j. This leaves 12 heterogeneity points and 32 probability
points to be estimated. A version in which there were no restrictions on the
probability distribution did not converge.
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for all x and y. Hence there are then 18 heterogeneity points and only three
probability points to be estimated.
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for all x and y. There are then 12 heterogeneity points and only two probability
points to be estimated.
Table 8 shows the found heterogeneity points under each of these three spec-
i¯cations. In all cases, the biggest relative spread in the heterogeneity terms
is found in the exits from work. If we use Akaike's information criterion, the
ranking in terms of which model gives most information becomes: ¯nal model Â
Spec. 2 Â Spec. 3 Â Spec. 1. The biggest increase in likelihood occurs when
we switch from 2 to 3 heterogeneity points, whereas increased °exibility of the
probability distribution delivers only marginal gains which barely make the ¯nal
speci¯cation, with a 27 point probability distribution, better than speci¯cation
2 in which there are only 3 probability points. Hence, as a rule of thumb `3 is
enough'.
4 Conclusions
Longer spells of well-paid employment increase future transition rates into work,
indicating that these individuals pick up more skills in longer-lasting well-paid
jobs. Combining this with the fact that the incomes during employment are
also higher for individuals with longer previous employment spells, this provides
evidence of a positive persistency of well-paid, long spells of employment.
The exit rates from non-employment (both unemployment and non-participation)
to work decrease somewhat with longer previous spells of non-employment, and
show marked drops if the previous spell of non-employment exceeds 2 years. This
is in line with Omori (1997) and Blau (1994) who also ¯nd a negative e®ect of
longer previous spells in non-employment on transition rates into employment.
On the other hand, longer non-employment spells also decrease transition rates
from employment to other states. This could be because individuals who take
more time to search for work will on average end up in better-quality job matches,
21including jobs with a high degree of stability. Another explanation is that long
non-employment spells are to some extent the result of childbearing episodes or
periods spent in full-time education. Individuals who re-integrate after such an
episode may have a strong preference for highly stable jobs.
Another robust ¯nding is that higher previous incomes in non-employment
increase the future transition rate from employment to unemployment and lower
the exit rates into work. This hints at moral hazard.
In an attempt to assess the aggregate e®ects of these persistencies, we use the
estimated models to simulate the consequences of switching o® certain persisten-
cies. These simulations reveal that the income persistencies from work do not
have major aggregate e®ects except for individuals between 20 and 30 years of
age, where these persistencies lead to higher levels of employment. The previous
duration of non-employment increases employment levels, probably because in-
dividuals with long periods without a job have much lower transition rates from
work. The implications of these simulations require a lot of caution because they
require imputations of incomes and imputations of changes in personal character-
istics. With these caveats in mind, the simulations predict that the contribution
of persistencies to inequality is only modest. Without persistencies, the over-all
inequality in the individual cumulative amount of time spent without work would
only be slightly smaller than what is actually observed. Variation in observed
and unobserved individual characteristics explains a much larger share of total
inequality. However, one may argue that inequality due to persistences may be
socially less acceptable than inequality due to acquired skills. After all, with
persistencies, small exogenous random shocks to which individuals are exposed
early on in their career create larger variations in outcomes across individuals
much later in life. While the idiosyncratic shocks early in life may be hard to
prevent, they lead to completely arbitrary inequality in wealth, and as such one
may advocate redistributional policies to counterbalance their e®ects. A more
modest policy would be to intervene in the causal chain created by the early
shocks, and make a strong e®ort to mitigate the skill losses of individuals with
very long spells in involuntary unemployment.
Our results imply that studies that restrict attention to persistencies across
non-employment spells may miss out on causal e®ects running through other
transition rates and incomes. The in°uence of those e®ects may then be picked
up by observed factors in the model.
A limitation of our study is that it is partial, which means that we do not know
whether the estimated e®ects are driven by supply factors or demand factors.
This means that supply-side explanations for speci¯c results should be made
22with caution.
An important omission in the analysis concerns the endogeneity of current
incomes with respect to previous labour market outcomes and unobserved hetero-
geneity. Ad hoc analyses in the Appendix show signi¯cant relationships between
incomes and previous labour market outcomes, but there are no instrumental
variables available to take proper account of endogeneities. It seems very likely
that the skills picked up in well-paid jobs that increase future exit rates into
employment will also increase future earnings in all states, which probably in-
creases exit rates into work. Similarly, the unobserved heterogeneity in the exit
rates to work is bound to be related to incomes. As long as incomes are weakly
endogenous, this problem does not a®ect the coe±cients for the transition rates.
However, the endogeneities do give rise to some caution concerning the validity
of the model simulations.
23Appendix
A1. Estimated unobserved heterogeneity distribution
First, we list the estimated probability masses of the heterogeneity distribution
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24For the marginal distributions of the heterogeneity distributions of the three
states, this reduces to
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The main item of interest is that each marginal distribution is for each
marginal probability distribution, there is at least 15% probability mass for any
of the points, which indicates that the population is divided into more than just
two groups.
A2. Simulations
In the simulations, the following steps were taken:
1. The joint distribution of age, gender, marital status, number of children,
and living in a big city is set exactly equal to the distribution of new entrants
in our sample. This was done by taking the initial characteristics at entry
as the starting piece of information.
2. All individuals are assigned a vector of unobserved heterogeneity points
according to the estimated probability distribution. This means that for
each individual we draw a vector of unobserved heterogeneity points from
a distribution that is obtained by construction a Bayesian estimate of the
unobserved heterogeneity distribution of an individual based on his actual
labour market history, with the estimated population densities as a prior
distribution.
3. Considering all observed characteristics, an individual is assigned an in-
come, by ¯rst specifying whether someone has a positive income or not
(probit), and then, for those with positive incomes, to take a random draw
of the estimated income distribution (log-normality with all characteristics
25as linear regressors, including previous lengths of employment and non-
employment spells (set at 0 for entrants)). This table is shown further
on.
4. (January 1st each simulated year). All ages are increased by one year.
Whether someone lives together and the number of children are re-assigned
according to an estimated competing risk probit-model using all observa-
tions, using the characteristics of the previous state as variables.
5. Each day an individual's hazard rate to the two possible exits is computed
(with the personal characteristics equal to the personal characteristics at
the start of the spell). A random draws determine who makes an exit.
6. If someone changes states, he is re-assigned a new income.
7. If someone reaches the age of 45, the simulation stops for that individual.
We mention that for the analysis of changes in household characteristics, we
could use the whole data set, for which we knew of all individuals at the start of
a new year what the household characteristics were at that moment.
Finally, Table 9 gives the results of the simple income model, in which we
estimated yk
i = I(®xi+vk
i )>0 exp(¯xi +ek
i); where k denotes a particular state, xi a
vector of characteristics at the start of a spell and where vk
i and ek
i are assumed
to be independently normally distributed. Constant terms are not shown. In
unemployment do all incomes exceed 0. Hence we do not estimate ® for unem-
ployment. To improve e±ciency and in order to allow us to simulate incomes for
ages not contained in the panel of entrants, all the observations in the Income
Panel are used, which changes the persistency variables we can use.
Of course, there are many endogenous variables in Table 9 (for instance the
inclusion of previous incomes and previous work duration), and this hampers
the interpretation. Given that these income regressions are only used for the
simulations, where the main issue is to predict incomes as good as possible, this
is not a major problem. Nevertheless, it is clear that persistencies may also run
by way of the income values.
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29Table 1: Summary statistics of individuals in the Income Panel data set at entry
current state Work Unemployment Non-participation Total
Variables
Age 17.4 22.1 18.4 17.9
Female 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.49
ln(taxable income per day in Dutch guilders) 2.59 3.41 0.42 2.09
number of children in household 1.13 0.46 0.83 1.03
Living together 0.94 0.67 0.89 0.92
Living in one of the 4 major cities 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.14
Individuals in percentages of whole 71% 4% 25% 100%
Table 2: The °ows between the three labour market states for individuals in the Income Panel
data set, in the period 1989-1997
destination: work unemployed non-part. right-censored Total
Source:
work 0 1214 4206 3059 8479
unemployed 1162 0 210 202 1574
non-participation 3807 163 0 1637 5607
Total 4969 1377 4416 4898 15660
30Table 3: The number of individuals having a certain number of spells in the Income Panel











10 or more spells 181
31Table 4: Results of the persistence model for Dutch labour market entrants: basic version without income.
State Work Unemployed Non-part
Variables n exit-state Unemployed Non-part Work Non-part Work Unemployed
Individual characteristics
Living together (0=no,1=yes) 0.06 -0.38** 0.34** -0.03 0.19** -0.10
ln(age) 2.02** -2.43** -1.25** -0.83 1.91** 3.06**
gender (1=female) -0.09 -0.00 -0.15** 0.06 -0.12** -0.10
# kids -0.13** 0.06 -0.03 -0.13 -0.14** -0.12
# kids*(gender) 0.04 -0.01 -0.19** 0.11 -0.00 -0.23
Big city (1=yes) 0.13 -0.10 -0.40** 0.17 -0.09 0.40**
age at entry*worka -0.84* 1.34** 0.39 1.42 -4.36** 2.38*
age at entry*not-work -0.93* 1.47** 0.24 1.41 -4.36** 2.16
entry year of current spell -0.07** 0.10** 0.12** 0.28** -0.01 -0.16**
Baseline
until day 32 -8.62 -5.58 -5.53 -8.63 -5.83 -8.20
day 33-63 -8.83** -6.31** -5.62** -8.35** -5.98** -9.24**
day 64-155 -8.50** -6.38** -5.61** -7.59** -5.54** -9.17**
day 155-366 -9.10** -6.61** -6.30** -7.27** -5.68** -9.25**
after day 365 -9.54** -5.07** -5.69** -7.73** -5.23** -8.82**
Season
After April 1 -0.11 1.05** 0.07 0.64** 0.78** 0.45*
Persistence e®ects
cum. non-work durb> 6 mo. 0.81** 0.30** 0.01 0.17 -0.25** 0.36
cum nw dur > 1 yr 0.05 0.11* 0.10 -0.11 0.22** 0.35
cum nw dur > 2 yr -0.15 -0.55** -0.13 -0.03 0.05 0.18
cum nw dur > 3 yr -0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.08 -0.15* -0.36
Heterogeneity points
point 1 (P=0.18) 0.32** 0.94** 1.82** 1.02** 0.30** 0.09**
point 2 (P=0.26) 0.24** 3.01** 1.02** 0.89** 0.85** 1.04**
point 3 (P=0.56) 0.05** 0.70** 1.04** 0.69** 0.13** 0.67**
Average Log likelihood -17.697
Percentages of total # spells 50% 18% 34%
a Interaction of age at entry and whether the ¯rst state was in work, b Total duration without a job,
* signif at 5%, ** signif. at 1 %. nw=non-work. Observed individual characteristics are normalised to mean zero.
32Table 5: Results of the persistence model for Dutch labour market entrants: version
without income but with extended persistence variables.
State Work Unemployed Non-part
Variables n exit-state Unemployed Non-part Work Non-part Work Unemployed
Individual characteristics
Living together (0=no,1=yes) -0.02 -0.32** 0.32** -0.03 0.14** -0.6
ln(age) -0.10 -2.65** -2.17** -0.42 0.70* 2.94*
gender (1=female) -0.06 -0.04 -0.16** 0.03 -0.08* -0.01
# kids -0.09* 0.10** -0.01 -0.14 -0.13** -0.04
# kids*(gender) 0.03 -0.02 -0.17* 0.12 0.01 -0.29
Big city (1=yes) 0.13 -0.10 -0.37** 0.13 -0.06 0.48**
age at entry*worka 0.83 1.48** 1.24** 1.13 -3.31** 2.53
age at entry*not-work 0.79 1.52** 1.29** 1.13 -3.18** 2.52
entry year of current spell -0.11** 0.10** 0.08** 0.26** -0.01 -0.21
Baseline
until day 32 -8.62 -5.58 -5.53 -8.63 -5.83 -8.20
day 33-63 -8.76** -6.27** -5.55** -8.42** -5.98** -8.96**
day 64-155 -8.44** -6.29** -5.52** -7.63** -5.59** -9.04**
day 155-366 -8.98** -6.48** -6.13** -7.30** -5.85** -9.23**
after day 365 -9.40** -4.96** -5.49** -7.83** -5.40** -8.45**
Season
After April 1 -0.08 1.08** 0.15 0.63** 0.72** 0.70**
Persistence e®ects
ln(cum. nw duration)b 0.31** -0.14** 0.14** 0.08 0.11** 0.25*
cum. nw dur > 6 mo. 0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.03 -0.21** 0.16
cum nw dur > 1 yr -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.21 0.15 0.34
cum nw dur > 2 yr -0.25* -0.47** -0.16 -0.08 -0.02 0.04
cum nw dur > 3 yr -0.14 0.05 0.16 0.04 -0.21** -0.41
ln(cum. work dur) 0.05 0.14** 0.10** 0.03 -0.03 0.09
ln(previous non-work dur) -0.20** 0.32** -0.11** -0.04 -0.12** -0.24*
ln(prev. work dur) 0.05 -0.12** 0.07* -0.04 0.11** 0.06
Heterogeneity points
point 1 (P=0.23) 0.74 0.61 0.85 1.75 0.40 0.12
point 2 (P=0.21) 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.94 0.84 0.67
point 3 (P=0.56) 2.68 0.05 0.71 0.71 0.17 0.39
Average Log likelihood -17.649
Percentages of total # spells 50% 18% 34%
a Interaction of age at entry and whether the ¯rst state was in work
b Total duration without a job. * signif at 5%, ** signif. at 1 % 33Table 6: Results of the persistence model with income and 27 possible unobserved
heterogeneity combinations for Dutch labour market entrants.
State Work Unemployed Non-part
Variables n exit-state Unemployed Non-part Work Non-part Work Unemployed
Individual characteristics
Living together (0=no,1=yes) -0.10 -0.27** 0.32** -0.02 0.14** -0.11
ln(age) -0.38 -1.40** -2.76** 0.17 1.39** 3,04*
gender (1=female) -0.07 -0.06 -0.14* 0.10 -0.08* -0.03
ln(max(daily income,1)) 0.189** -0.42** -.64** -0.24* -0.27** -0.12**
# kids -0.06 0.04* -0.00 -0.13 -0.11** -0.15
# kids*(gender) 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.23
Big city (1=yes) 0.12 -0.03 -0.39** 0.18 -0.04 0.38*
age at entry*worka 0.64 1.43** 0.79 1.12 -3.52** 2.49
age at entry*not-work 0.71 1.45** 0.79 1.23 -3.39** 2.63*
entry year of current spell -0.11** 0.07** 0.04** 0.28** -0.01 -0.18**
Baseline
until day 32 -8.62 -5.58 -5.53 -8.63 -5.83 -8.20
day 33-63 -8.73** -6.32** -5.53** -8.32** -5.97** -9.17**
day 64-155 -8.28** -6.34** -5.42** -7.58** -5.55** -9.12**
day 155-366 -8.52** -6.50** -5.86** -7.29** -5.79** -9.02**
after day 365 -8.84** -4.96** -5.30** -7.81** -5.34** -8.41**
Season
After April 1 0.10 1.09** 0.23** 0.60** 0.74** 0.65**
Persistence e®ects
ln(cum. nw duration)b -0.04 -0.02 0.23** 0.13 0.06* -0.13
cum. nw dur > 6 mo. 0.12 -0.06 -0.11 -0.00 -0.18** 0.25
cum nw dur > 1 yr -0.06 0.10 -0.03 -0.20 0.12* 0.16
cum nw dur > 2 yr -0.50** -0.36** -0.19 -0.09 -0.01 0.11
cum nw dur > 3 yr -0.08 0.03 0.17 0.03 -0.16* -0.34
ln(cum. work dur) 0.23** 0.12** 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.29**
ln(previous non-work dur) 0.09* 0.18** -0.18** -0.07 -0.09** 0.02
ln(prev. work dur) -0.13** -0.04 0.19** 0.02 0.06** -0.05
ln(Income prev. job) 0.05 -0.05** 0.12** -0.15 0.08** 0.09
ln(Income prev. non-work) 0.15** -0.42** -0.11** -0.06 -0.08** 0.19**
ln(cum income) -0.03 0.02 -0.10* 0.01 0.01 -0.04
Heterogeneity points
point 1 2.59** 0.60** 0.25** 1.26** 0.19** 0.37**
point 2 0.21** 0.22** 0.10** 1.35** 0.44** 0.52**
point 3 0.45** 0.13** 0.39** 0.96** 0.13** 0.05**
Average Log likelihood -17.510
Percentages of total # spells 50% 18% 34%
a Interaction of age at entry and whether the ¯rst state was in work
b Total duration without a job. * signif at 5%, ** signif. at 1 %
34Table 7: Estimated measures of cumulative non-employment duration
inequality of individuals aged 40
Cross-section Baseline no-income no non-empl. no unobs.
at age 40 simulation persistencies persistencies heterogeneity
90/10 non-emp. dur. decile 1 8.5 8.1 8.9 5.4
var(ln(cum. non-empl. dur.) 1 1.33 1.20 1.06 0.69
Gini-coe±cient non-empl. dur 0.46 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.17
Table 8: Heterogeneity points found under di®erent speci¯cations with income
Work Unemployment Other Average Number
unem. other work other work unem. Log-lik of params
Specif. 1 -17.5280 193
point 1 2.32 0.46 0.28 0.80 0.27 0.20
point 2 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.66 0.30 0.18
Specif. 2 -17.5149 170
point 1 2.41 0.60 0.30 0.82 0.23 0.40
point 2 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.94 0.55 0.52
point 3 0.45 0.12 0.46 0.85 0.16 0.06
Specif. 3 -17.5298 163
point 1 2.25 0.61 0.15 0.70 0.20 0.33
point 2 0.38 0.17 0.26 0.78 0.34 0.19
Final spec -17.5100 194
point 1 2.59 0.60 0.25 1.26 0.19 0.37
point 2 0.21 0.22 0.10 1.35 0.44 0.52
point 3 0.45 0.13 0.39 0.96 0.13 0.05
35Table 9: Results of the income model
State Work Unemployed Non-participation
® ¯ ¯ ® ¯
Living together (0=no,1=yes) -0.07 0.22** -0.04 0.18** -0.08
ln(age) 0.92 2.93** 2.07** -2.02** 2.10**
gender (1=female) -0.04 -0.11** -0.04 -0.06 -0.16*
# kids 0.013 -0.11** -0.04 -0.06* -0.14**
# kids*(gender) 0.13 -0.01 -0.06* 0.05 0.15*
Big city (1=yes) -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.12* 0.05
age at entry*worka 0.51 -0.12 -0.80** 0.54 -0.25
age at entry*not-work 0.48 -0.16 -0.78** 0.48 -0.22
ln(cum. nw duration)b -0.13 -0.01 -0.03* 0.16** -0.04
cum. nw dur > 6 mo. 0.34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.01
cum nw dur > 1 yr 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
cum nw dur > 2 yr 0.20 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04
cum nw dur > 3 yr -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.06
ln(cum. work dur) 0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.13** 0.15**
ln(previous non-work dur) -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08* -0.05
ln(prev. work dur) -0.08 -0.02 -0.07** -0.01 -0.18**
ln(Income prev. job) -0.07 0.07** 0.14** -0.05* 0.23**
ln(Income prev. non-work) -0.03 0.13** 0.04** -0.28** 0.08**
ln(cum income) 0.08** -0.005 0.04** 0.03 0.07*
¯rst spell? (1=yes) 0.01 -0.09 0.26 -1.02** 0.53
day of entry 0.002** 0.000 0.0002* 0.003** -0.0007**
year of entry -0.68** -0.07* -0.09** -1.03** 0.25**
Log likelihood / R2 -547.35 0.32 0.25 -1979.1 0.29
N 8479 8368 1585 5611 832
a Interaction of age at entry and whether the ¯rst state was in work
b Total duration without a job. * signif at 5%, ** signif. at 1 %
36Figure 1: 3-point heterogeneity distribution
Figure 2: 27-point heterogeneity distributionSurvival rate for the transition from work to unemployment
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Figure 3a-3f: survival rates for males and females combined.Survival rate females from work to unemployment
days
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